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During the 1960s, Iran transitioned from a client state into an emerging partner of America. 
Crucial to the analysis of this transformation is understanding how Iran progressed from a 
low-priority military aid recipient in the 1950s to a military credit purchase partner in 1964. 
The transformation was characterized by frequent difficulties and disagreements as the 
Shah’s demands and Washington’s ability and/or desire to fulfill those demands rarely 
coalesced until the twilight of the Johnson Administration.  
 
 
In 1971, Iran was America’s largest arms export customer. One year later, in May 1972 the 
Shah of Iran agreed a deal with Richard Nixon that gave him a blank check to purchase 
whatever arms he desired from America, short of nuclear weapons and to make those 
purchases without any interference or oversight from Washington – a highly unique 
agreement. What followed was annual multi-billion dollar arms purchase pattern that 
catapulted Iran within a few short years from a relatively backward state into one that wielded 
one of the most technologically advanced militaries in the world. Yet, by early 1979 the Shah 
had been overthrown in a violent revolution, after which the high-level arms relationship 
between America and Iran ground to a sudden halt as a virulently anti-American Islamic 
Regime took power in Iran – a state of affairs that has remained to the present day. While the 
Nixon years are relatively well addressed in the literature in U.S-Iranian studies, the Johnson 
years are comparatively under researched. Hence, an opportunity exists in revisiting the mid-
1960s to lay better foundations for the understanding of the unique position that the U.S-
Iranian relationship had reached in the 1970s.  
 
Johnson’s predecessor, John F. Kennedy had a broad ideological approach to foreign policy 
based on economic aid rather than military aid, and expressed an antipathy for authoritarian 
regimes, such as that of the Shah. Hence, it is understandable why certain historians have 
described the Kennedy years as the ‘nadir’ in relations between America and Iran, after which 
the transformation of relations between the two nations began to gradually take shape.
1
 This 
assessment is correct with respect to the fact that the Kennedy administration came closer 
than any previous administration did to actually considering removing support for the Shah, 
in lieu of supporting an alternative form of government in Iran. Yet, by the spring of 1962 the 
relationship was largely back where it had been in the 1950s where acceptance for the Shah 
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and steady American support for his regime as a staunchly pro-American leader in an 
unstable Cold War hot spot was assured. 
 
As Johnson assumed the presidency in November 1963, there was every reason to assume 
that the steady momentum in relations with Iran would continue. However, closer 
examination of the Johnson years reveals that relations became extremely rocky after 1964, 
and critical by mid 1966, with arms issues the express driver of the tensions. Johnson is 
traditionally portrayed as a president who was determined to have a domestic agenda, a desire 
that was ultimately eroded by ever increasing American escalation in Vietnam.
2
 That 
overwhelming focus on Vietnam consumed the bulk of the foreign policy attention of the 
administration and led to a dangerous drift in relations with Cold War periphery states such as 
Iran. This development has been largely ignored, with precious little examination of this 
period of U.S-Iran relations in the literature on Johnson’s foreign policy,3 and yet less again 
on the arms issues between the Shah and the Johnson administration.
4
 The lack of detailed 
investigation has caused a distortion within the general historiography of the period, evident 
throughout the literature, which often assumes, erroneously, that relations with Iran were 
stable and progressing well in the Johnson period. A prominent example is Richard W. 
Cottam, who in a frequently cited case study of Iran-US relations in the Cold War,
5
 stated that 
the mid 1960s were part of a ‘decade of stability’.6 Douglas Little makes a similar error by 
presenting, very briefly, a triumphant picture of US-Iran relations in the Johnson era.
7
 
 
During the Johnson years, Iran made a transition in American estimates from being 
considered a relatively weak client state under a U.S. Cold War security umbrella, into 
becoming an emerging partner of America. Crucial to the analysis of this transformation is 
understanding how Iran progressed from being a fairly low priority military and economic aid 
recipient in the 1950s, to becoming a military credit purchase partner from 1964 onwards - in 
which Iran began to pay for its own military development as opposed to receiving grant aid. 
The transformation was not smooth, nor linear. It was characterized by frequent difficulties 
and disagreements as the Shah’s demands and Washington’s ability and/or desire to fulfil 
those demands rarely coalesced until the twilight of the Johnson administration.  
 
The Shah’s graduation from aid to credit laid the basis via which the remaining years of his 
rule would be characterised within the scope of U.S.-Iran relations. It also laid the 
groundwork for the practical application of the Nixon doctrine: Through the 1960s the Shah 
developed a thesis in which he believed that the Soviets were engaging in ‘wars by proxy’ in 
Egypt and Iraq in order to gradually encroach upon and disrupt western access to Gulf Oil.
8
 
With Vietnam in mind, the Shah noted that it would be better for Iran to be fully equipped to 
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deal with a similar situation in the Middle East, as if the entire might of the American military 
industrial complex could not settle Vietnam it was not a viable model that could be repeated 
elsewhere. Of course, this thesis was designed to compliment his military designs, but one 
Tehran visitor upon whom the Shah’s thesis made an historic impact was Richard Nixon who 
visited the Shah in 1967, and remained on close terms with the monarch through his 
presidency.
9
 
 
The transition of Iran to a regional partner backed with a modern American arms arsenal was 
therefore borne out of Cold War concerns - principally fears of American overstretch due to 
Vietnam. This transition inescapably has its roots in the Johnson years despite a tendency to 
look only post-1968 for origins. The Shah, an astute statesman and cunning operator, was 
able to skilfully play on American fears of losing Iran to Soviet influence – as in the cases of 
Iraq, India, and Egypt amongst others – and harness a brinkmanship strategy through the 
1960s via which he was able to manoeuvre into a position in which his designs for his nation 
eventually came to a synergy with a slowly changing mood in Washington. The Shah 
envisioned modern Iran as the rebirth of the Persian Empire, and aspired to a regional 
hegemonic role within the Gulf. When the British announced, in January 1968, that they 
would withdraw their military presence ‘east of Suez’ and in doing so remove their significant 
forces from the Gulf – the Shah was willing and ready to step into the breach and exercise his 
grand plan for Iran. Hence, the 1964-1968 period is rich with insight. Developments of arms 
credit sales and the strategic concerns that drove those developments are important in 
enriching our understanding of not just U.S.-Iranian diplomatic history, but of the evolution 
of American strategy and thinking within the Cold War.  
I ran and the Early Johnson Years: 1964-1965 
 
U.S. military aid to Iran began on a very limited scale in 1950, as part of a seven-year 
program of $124 million, the bulk of which was delivered between 1950 and 1954.
10
 The 
consistent American position established by Truman in 1950 and subsequently maintained by 
Eisenhower who renewed – and increased – military aid in 1958, was that the aid program 
was intended only to build Iran’s forces up to the level where they could be effective to 
facilitate the internal security and viability of Iran, and to allow Iran to play a role within 
CENTO – the NATO inspired anti-Soviet regional bloc of Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and 
Britain.
11
 Yet, the Shah consistently read his regional position differently, desiring a modern 
military of significance. Hence, from the outset the perceptions in Washington and the 
perceptions of the Shah over military aid were deeply mismatched.  
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While Washington was broadly satisfied with a five-year military aid program that had been 
agreed with Iran in early 1963, which again renewed the American investment in Iran’s 
armed forces that had originated in 1950, the Shah remained far from content. He expressed 
his dissatisfaction in a letter to President Johnson in January 1964, requesting that the 
President urgently re-open a debate around Iran’s defense needs, chiefly due to the ever 
increasing regional menace of Arab nationalism which he assessed as a direct territorial 
threat.
12
 Whilst the Shah continued to press his case to anyone within his reach throughout 
early-mid 1964,
13
 the Johnson administration became locked in something of a false reality, 
fed not just by its internal focus on domestic politics, but also fed by inaccurate intelligence. 
In one such example, a National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) delivered by the CIA on 20 May 
1964 reported conclusively that the Shah was ‘satisfied’ with the status quo.14  
 
Only one week following the delivery of the 20 May NIE, Julius C. Holmes, American 
Ambassador to Iran, cabled Secretary of State Dean Rusk, noting that the Shah was already 
thinking years beyond the 1963 five-year aid program, and that his attitude was ‘changing as 
the country’s financial position is improving’ due to increased oil revenues and increased 
political stabilisation.
15
 Holmes reported that the Shah had expressed the need for a series of 
credit and cash purchases, to supplement the aid Iran already received, which provoked a 
series of ‘intensive’ discussions aimed at bringing the Shah’s requests ‘down to the level 
where they are reasonable’ in respect to Iran’s ability to take on credit and absorb advanced 
military equipment.
16
 News of the nature of the growing discontent in Tehran eventually 
reached Johnson via NSC Staffer Robert Komer on 4 June. Komer conceded to the 
inevitability, most visibly conveyed by Holmes, that despite frequent pressure to the contrary, 
the Shah’s focus ‘keeps reverting to the military toys he loves.’17 Hence, the wheels began to 
slowly turn to a realisation that a new deal would need to be brokered. Komer’s concerns 
reflected a prevailing wisdom in Washington that stretched back to Truman, but had been 
most clearly enunciated by Kennedy, that Iran should prioritise economic and social spending 
rather than devote too much of its budget to its military. The Shah never accepted this 
cautionary advice.  
 
The Shah’s unwavering persistence did eventually gain enough traction to result in an 
agreement on 2 July 1964 of a five-year program of military credit for the period 1965-1969. 
Further, the existing grant aid agreement that had been put in place by Kennedy, and was 
scheduled to end in 1967, was extended for a further two years. Hence, Iran was placed in a 
fairly rare position of being both a major aid recipient, and a long-term credit partner. The 
deal consisted of $200 million in US military credit for Iran, plus a $50 million upfront 
Iranian cash component to purchase a range of military equipment, including 4 C-130 aircraft 
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and 176 M-60A1 tanks.
18
 The Department of Defense and the Agency for International 
Development (AID) brokered the deal in such a way as to make it clearly contingent on an 
annual review of the effect of military spending on the Iranian economy, rather than a strict 
annual ceiling for the purchases, and stressed that credit would be immediately withdrawn if 
the Shah was to go ‘too fast’ in using up his credit.19 Hence, the deal – although a step change 
in the sense that it involved credit not aid – was firmly in the vein of established American 
policy to closely means-test military transfers to Iran based on its economic situation.  
 
Yet, on 4 July, the very day that the Shah signed the agreement, he was already enquiring 
about additional equipment outside the agreed purchase plan, including two squadrons of F-
4C fighter jets intended as upgrades to his existing squadrons of F-5As, and a new radar 
station.
20
 The enquiries continued apace into 1965, with frequent bullish assurances that 
Iran’s gradually increasing oil revenues allowed it to increase its purchases without damaging 
domestic economic reforms. This was the very embodiment of fears expressed one year 
earlier in June 1964 by Robert Komer when he noted of the Shah; ‘his rapidly growing oil 
revenues have gone to his head’.21 A State Department-Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) meeting on 
23 April 1965 greeted news that the Shah had migrated his attention to purchasing a squadron 
of comparatively advanced, and expensive, F-111 fighters with the comment; ‘it is a constant 
struggle to keep the Shah’s appetite within bounds.’ 22  That struggle would characterise 
relations with Iran for the remainder of the Johnson administration.  
 
Armin Meyer, who assumed the position of U.S. Ambassador to Iran on 18 March 1965, was 
issued with instructions before his departure to Tehran in a brief meeting with Johnson to 
press upon the Shah that ‘good economics is good politics’ and that he should ‘use all his arts 
of persuasion to influence the Shah in the right direction.’23 That direction was one in which 
the Shah had become increasingly unreceptive now that he had a taste of a more substantial 
military purchase relationship outside the bounds of aid. Meyer was immediately sequestered 
after presenting his credentials to the Shah with a request for progress on his latest arms 
enquiries, including the F-111 order.
24
 The eventual reply came six weeks later on 8 June as 
NSC staffer Harold Saunders cabled Meyer to ‘stall’ the Shah on his ambitions to purchase 
the F-111 as the administration wished to, in Saunders’ words,  ‘drag our feet on less 
reasonable requests’.25 The Shah also took the opportunity upon his first meeting with Meyer 
to add a request for surface to air missiles after an enquiry of purchasing naval destroyers and 
motor torpedo boats to patrol the Gulf had been rejected in Washington. Both of these 
requests had been deemed unnecessary due to increased U.S. Naval presence in the Indian 
Ocean and the lack of domestic Iranian expertise to operate the equipment.
26
 Thus, the 
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situation was becoming increasingly tense as the Shah’s expectations were frequently sold 
short in Washington. 
 
The Johnson administration miscalculated badly by hedging that the July 1964 $250 million 
deal would satisfy the Shah, in effect, letting the cat out of the bag with the five-year credit 
agreement. The essence of the miscalculation hinged on the fact that rather than face the 
problem of the growing gulf between Iranian and American assessments of Iran’s security 
needs, the Johnson administration adopted a policy of purposeful dithering and stalling due to 
its preoccupation in the domestic arena, and with Vietnam. Additionally, any idea of urgency 
was further deferred, as the administration did not believe that Iran would move outside the 
American sphere of influence simply as a result of the Shah’s frustrations over arms issues, 
and there was broad acceptance that the Shah frequently exaggerated the wider security threat 
of Arab nationalism that he often used to justify his defense needs.
27
 
 
A turning point was reached when Meyer communicated evidence in November 1965 that the 
Shah had begun seeking military equipment from non-American sources. Most notably, the 
Soviets had offered the Shah alternatives to the equipment America had refused him, 
including advanced MIG aircraft, in early September 1965.
28
 The omens for 1966 in U.S.-Iran 
relations were looking increasingly testing.  
1966-1967: The Real Nadir 
 
Feeling that his regional situation had become yet more acute following the protracted war 
between India and Pakistan in mid-1965 and the continued spectre of Arab nationalism, the 
Shah decreed in November 1965 that a further $200 million of military purchases would be 
sought to meet Iran’s vital security needs, preferably from America, but if not then from 
elsewhere.
29
 In response, Meyer was instructed by Rusk to inform the Shah that the political 
climate in Washington would not allow for such a transaction.
30
 In a lengthy exchange with 
Meyer on 25 November, which Meyer reported via a list of nineteen separate subject 
headings, the Shah laid out a veritable tour de force of regional instability vis-à-vis Iran. The 
assessment was broadly consistent with previous assessments the Shah had made, with the 
notable addition of a prediction that the British would withdraw from Aden and the Gulf 
Principalities by between 1968 and 1970 – hence making a militarily upgraded Iran the 
‘single constructive free world power capable of protecting commerce and peace’ in the 
region.
31
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On 2 February 1966 William B. Macomber, Assistant Administrator for the Near East and 
South Asia division of AID briefed Jeffrey C. Kitchen, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, 
that the Shah’s $200 million purchase plan was contrary to the spirit of the existing aid and 
credit agreements with America and would have an adverse impact on Iran’s economy.32 The 
issue reached the Pentagon in mid-February where Assistant Secretary of Defense, John T. 
McNaughton recommended that a military survey team be despatched to Iran to have a closer 
look the Shah’s needs. Defense Secretary Robert McNamara concurred, but added in response 
that his backing was given ‘reluctantly & for planning only.’33  
 
Predictably unsatisfied at the lack of movement in Washington, the Shah took his case 
directly to Johnson via letter on 26 February 1966, noting that the continued military 
weakness of Iran may make it susceptible to ‘the evils of aggression’ such as witnessed in 
Vietnam, before re-emphasizing his threat to seek arms elsewhere if an American change in 
course was not forthcoming.
34
 The letter was characteristically pushy, almost desperate in 
tone. Johnson’s comparatively sober reply agreed that the lessons of Vietnam pointed clearly 
towards the need for ‘healthy and orderly’ states to act as anchors to ensure the ‘peace and 
stability’ of their immediate region. However he underlined that no decision on arms sales 
would be made until the report of the recently despatched military survey team was 
completed and fully discussed later in the spring.
35
 Johnson’s reply also made a substantial, 
yet implicit, reference that Iran would be better served by a more diverse allocation of its 
resources. Picking up on this gesture, the Shah replied again with a lengthy and triumphant 
listing of his domestic and economic achievements, before again reminding Johnson of his 
acute military needs.
36
  
 
In the months following his exchange with Johnson, the Shah considered buying surface-to-
air missiles from the Soviet Union, a deal that he ultimately withdrew from, instead buying a 
range of lower order military equipment from Moscow. This demonstrated to the Johnson 
administration that whilst the Shah was not prepared to sit idly and wait for America to 
answer his needs, he was still reticent to engage in a high-level defense partnership with the 
Soviets, and contributed to the perception within the Johnson administration that the 
appeasement strategy of dithering was a fairly safe course. Yet, the fact remained that the 
Shah had taken tentative yet tangible steps in demonstrating that his patience was not infinite.  
 
Four new elements, compounding upon prior events, gradually pushed the administration into 
offering a deal that matched the Shah’s $200 million request as spring turned to summer in 
1966. The first element was a stable stream of reporting from the CIA indicating that tensions 
with Iran, due to arms negotiations, were reaching dangerous levels. The first such report can 
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be found within a NIE delivered on 24 March. The document concluded that, ‘the changes of 
the past few years have altered the climate of US-Iranian relations’, conceding that ‘the Shah 
has become increasingly dissatisfied with US unwillingness to provide the amount and kind 
of arms he wants.’37 The report further concluded that the US should be ‘at least moderately 
forthcoming’ with regard to additional sales yet fully cognisant that further military 
expenditure could cause periods of inflation and recession within Iran.
38
 The broad thrust of 
the study assessed that the Shah was unlikely to do an about face and move into the Soviet 
sphere, but that serious dangers to the relationship between Iran and America were brewing 
due to the arms disputes. Thus, the study indicates that the reasons for the beginning of a 
rethink in Washington came from wider strategic fears of Iran moving beyond American 
influence, rather than an agreement with the Shah’s concerns over Arab nationalism which 
the paper assessed were ‘exaggerated’,39 maintaining consistency in that regard with earlier 
reports.  
 
A further CIA intelligence memorandum advised on 6 May that the Shah’s rapprochement 
with the Soviets was a crucial test by the monarch aimed squarely at ensuring America 
fulfilled his security needs, and that U.S.-Iranian relations ‘may reach a critical point’ as a 
result.
40
 Hence by mid 1966, the CIA developed a consistent line, indicating fairly strongly 
that the risk of miscalculation in dealing with the Shah was severe, and that the previously 
dominant concerns of Iranian domestic economic stability when assessing military purchases 
may need to be substituted for more important Cold War geopolitical concerns.  
 
The second element was the report of the Iran survey group, which was eventually delivered 
on 22 March, and began the slow process of bouncing around various administration offices 
in Washington through April and May.
41
 The report had the unintended consequence of not 
simply concurring with the Shah’s security assessments, but actually expanding upon them. It 
recommended a supplemental equipment program on top of all pre-existing programmes 
costed out at $328 million, which caused ‘animated disagreements’ across the 
administration.
42
  
 
Armin Meyer was recalled to Washington in early May for a series of briefings with the 
President, Rusk, and McNamara to attempt to find a mutually acceptable course of action in 
light of the survey group report that would work in Washington, and also placate the Shah. In 
a preliminary meeting with McNamara, Meyer noted that the McNamara’s ‘first words’ were 
that that he was not prepared to authorise ‘a nickels worth’ of further defense supplies to Iran 
outside of the previously agreed amounts.
43
 Meyer noted that the meeting was one of the 
toughest of his career, and inferred that steady concerns of the impact of excessive military 
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spending on Iran’s economic development were only part of the problem, the other being that 
McNamara and his team had been subject to a series of gruelling battles on Capitol Hill over 
the escalation in costs and manpower in Vietnam which had a direct, and prohibitive effect on 
countenancing any increase in military credit for Iran.
44
 Whilst McNamara was openly hostile, 
Johnson was more sympathetic, noting to Meyer that the report’s findings made for ‘a good 
case’.45  
 
As Meyer left Washington to return to Tehran on 14 May, he despatched an impassioned 
letter to McNamara, making one final plea to the staunchest member of the ‘no’ camp. Meyer 
wrote,  
No one can dispute the concerns which you hold concerning the undesirability of 
countries like Iran expending funds for military hardware when their resources can 
much more beneficially be invested in economic development. Nor can one deny that 
the threat which the Shah fears is exaggerated. 
Yet, 
Going forward with additional sales to Iran is of considerable political value. The 
Shah is one of the best friends we have in the Afro-Asian milieu.
46
 
Meyer continued by noting that the recently agreed grant aid program for Turkey was in the 
regions of $140 million, which was of great confusion to the Shah, who unlike Turkey, was 
asking to buy his military equipment with his own money, which reinforced the Shah’s 
barbed claim made some years earlier that America treated Iran like a concubine, whilst it 
treated Iran’s regional neighbours like wives.47 
 
Seeking a solution, Walt Rostow, who had replaced McGeorge Bundy as National Security 
Adviser in February 1966, noted to Johnson that ‘most of us believe the Shah is foolish to 
spend his money this way… but since he is determined to buy arms somewhere, the best we 
can do is to lean on the brakes.’48 A limited compromise deal, in line with Rostow’s idea of 
permitting further, albeit restricted, credit sales, was fleshed out in the week following 
Meyer’s visit.49 Meyer dutifully broached news of the tentative deal to the Shah on 21 May, 
yet the deal was fairly stunted, and Meyer’s anticipation that upon hearing the terms of the 
deal, ‘the Shah may scream’, turned out to be an accurate prediction.50 The deal contained 
only a fraction of the F-4E Phantom jets the Shah deemed essential for his security, and was 
replete with long lead off times, and prohibitive research and development costs which 
diminished significantly the actual physical return the Shah would get for his money. 
 
Meyer’s Ambassadorial proximity to the Shah, and his mindset, led him to vocalise in an 
impassioned memorandum to Johnson on 23 May that the administration was ‘about to 
alienate the Shah’ with its ‘Papa knows best’ attitude, exemplified by the May compromise 
deal.
51
 Meyer laid out a case that whilst a broadly paternalistic approach towards Iran had 
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been appropriate in the past, it was ‘altogether unrealistic in 1966’ due to the political 
maturation of the Shah, and of Iran as a nation.
52
 Meyer’s persuasiveness that a more 
accommodating position was necessary was broadly accepted within the State Department, 
with the main remaining question at Foggy Bottom being one of not ‘if’ but ‘how far we need 
to go to meet the Shah’s demands’.53 With Meyer’s memorandum in mind, Johnson attempted 
to ease the Shah’s mindset whilst deliberations continued in Washington. In a letter to the 
Shah dated 20 July, Johnson explained the nature of the limits in military sales enforced by 
Congress, conveyed fears of advanced American technology falling into the hands of the 
Soviets, and reaffirmed the primary focus of defense resources on Vietnam.
54
 It was a 
platitude at best, and had no effect on the Shah’s single-minded goal of getting what he 
wanted.
55
  
 
Kermit ‘Kim’ Roosevelt, Grandson of former President Theodore Roosevelt, provided the 
third new element that significantly influenced arms policy to Iran as he arrived back in 
Washington from a trip to Tehran in late July. Roosevelt was Vice President of the Gulf Oil 
Company and had directed the 1953 Iranian Coup in his former role within the CIA’s Special 
Activities Division, and had maintained a close interest in Iran, and a close personal 
relationship with the Shah – whom the Coup effectively reinstated as Iran’s ruler.56 Roosevelt 
met with Vice President Hubert Humphrey’s aide George Carroll on 27 July 1966, who noted 
of Roosevelt: ‘No American knows the Shah of Iran as well as does Kim’. 57  Roosevelt 
successfully convinced Carroll, of the ‘urgency’ of the ‘parting of the ways’ between the 
Shah and the Johnson administration over the arms issue, to the point that Carroll briefed 
Humphrey the very same day to take action on the problem.
58
 Humphrey duly took the issue 
to McNamara the following morning asking for ‘quick footwork’ to break out of the impasse 
with the Shah.
59
  
 
One day following Humprey’s plea for quick footwork, with tension high in Washington as a 
result of Roosevelt’s injection of fresh alarmism, Walt Rostow condensed the various existing 
positions within the administration in a memorandum for the President. McNamara remained 
predictably unreceptive, expressing the impression that the Shah, via Roosevelt, was resorting 
to blackmail. Dean Rusk went further, noting that a ‘loosening’ of American ties to the Shah 
was not necessarily a bad thing as increasing American commitments to the monarch had left 
him feeling ‘a little uneasy’, hence breaking suddenly from the received wisdom observed in 
the State Department, and the position fleshed out by Meyer.
60
 Hence, there was a reasonable 
prospect that Roosevelt may have done more harm than good in his efforts by, in effect, 
polarising the debate. Rusk’s turn was not shared by the bulk of his colleagues at the State 
Department, some of whom, led by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern 
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Affairs, Jeffrey C. Kitchen, were lining up to persuade Rusk to petition the Department of 
Defense to take a more accommodating line with Iran, as advocated by Meyer.
61
  
 
The fourth and final element that roundly completed the reorientation of arms policy came 
when news reached Washington in late July via Israeli channels
62
 that the Shah had accepted 
a Soviet offer of several squadrons of MIG-21 aircraft at favourable credit terms and at one 
quarter the price of the comparable American F-4Es. While Washington had been alarmed at 
early indicators of arms discussions between Iran and the Soviets some weeks earlier, there 
was no expectation at the highest level of the State Department that the Shah would actually 
accept a deal.
63
 News of the deal reached the British before it reached Washington as part of a 
curious Iranian strategy to seek British support to convince the Americans of the necessity 
and logic of Iran buying arms from the Soviets – to which the British refused, commenting 
that the deal was ‘misguided and highly dangerous’.64 The British angle here provides the 
clearest indication that the Shah’s plans regarding the Soviet deal were a clear make or break 
moment for both Iran and America. The Shah clearly favoured a good relationship with 
America, and had a preference for American technology, but his domestic defense needs as he 
envisioned them were going unmet. The attractive terms offered by the Soviets allowed the 
Shah a final leveraging gesture: Without a significant new credit package from America, he 
had a good deal on the table with the Soviets for his advanced military requirements, which 
he was prepared to (reluctantly) take. Together with the study group recommendations, the 
CIA intelligence, and the first hand accounts of Meyer and Roosevelt, the Soviet offer proved 
to be the final straw. Whether it was genuine, or a high-stakes piece of grand brinkmanship on 
the part of the Shah, the Johnson administration was forced to into action. Continuing the 
dithering strategy and waiting for events to play out was simply too much of a gamble for 
Washington at this juncture. 
 
A new arms deal for Iran was swiftly brokered in a closed meeting between Johnson, Rusk, 
Rostow and McNamara on 2 August.
65
 The deal awarded Iran an additional $200 million line 
of credit, broadly matching the Shah’s own initial request, but coming in vastly below the 
study group’s recommendation. The credit would be spread over 4 years at no more than $50 
million per annum with no provision for frontloading. Each annual tranche was strictly 
contingent on presidential approval based on a review of the economic health of Iran. Hence 
the compromise somewhat addressed the consistent reservations of AID that such a high level 
of credit would upset economic development,
66
 and gave the Pentagon a more manageable 
annual figure to massage through the tight Congressional scrutiny placed on military credit 
sales.  
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Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Affairs, was 
despatched to Tehran on 8 August to personally deliver the compromise deal to the Shah. 
Hoopes was instructed to re-state the practical reasons for the limits the administration placed 
on the deal – such as the annual tranches, but make those limits ‘as palatable as possible’ for 
the increasingly petulant monarch,
67
 whom Armin Meyer had taken to regularly calling ‘His 
Nibs’68  in his Ambassadorial correspondence due to his enhanced confidence due to his 
dealings with the Soviets. Hoopes was instructed to convey that the purchased equipment 
would be delivered on an accelerated schedule, and that certain research and developments 
costs would be scrapped where possible. The deal was strictly conditional on the Shah’s 
clarification of his intentions on entering an advanced arms relationship with the Soviets.
69
 
 
The Hoopes visit went smoothly on the surface, with Meyer noting that the provision for the 
sale of 32 F-4Es within the package, a significant increase on the failed May deal, had 
‘carried the day’.70 The Shah agreed to forbid Soviet technicians in Iran, and signalled a 
strong preference for the American offer in lieu of the Soviet alternatives on the table, 
demurring characteristically that the revised offer was ‘constructive, comprehensive and 
expensive’.71 Concluding his impressions of the state of affairs following a briefing from 
Hoopes and Armin Meyer, Rostow conveyed to Johnson that it had gone ‘pretty well’, and 
had ‘gone a long way toward keeping the Shah from going overboard’ by managing to ‘keep 
the worst we had feared from happening’.72 Hence, to utilise Rostow’s earlier analogy, the 
August deal was symptomatic of leaning off the brakes just enough to placate the Shah.  
 
The sense of relief in Washington, encapsulated in Rostow’s comments lasted only five days. 
A letter arrived in Washington on 15 August from the Shah in which he thanked Johnson for 
sending Hoopes to restate at such length the terms of the deal, and the reasons for the 
restrictions. Yet, rather than express gratitude for the offer Hoopes had tabled, the Shah noted 
that the deal ‘still falls short of meeting Iran’s needs’ and that ‘future generations will not 
forgive me if I fail to pay every attention to my country’s defense requirements’. 73 The 
August 1966 deal would become symptomatic of the encounters that followed through the 
remainder of the Johnson administration and the early Nixon years, as time and time again, 
the Shah would begrudgingly accept a deal, then quickly prove unsatisfied with it and barter 
for more. Encapsulating the pervading American impression of the process of negotiating 
with the Shah, Meyer later lamented:  
…trying to satisfy the Shah’s demands proved to be the most difficult challenge with 
which we at the embassy had to cope. Within weeks after an agreement was reached, 
royal pressure would be exerted for additional military hardware, better prices, and 
speedier delivery.
74
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While the August 1966 deal had done enough to keep Iran from signing the Soviet deal, it did 
not solve the on-going crisis in relations between America and Iran, which persisted into the 
following year. 
From Nadir to Tentative Partnership: 1967 -1968 
 
The Shah’s scheduled visit to Washington on 22 August 1967 was an opportunity to press his 
security concerns, and was regarded with high priority in Tehran. Unfortunately for the Shah, 
an unforeseen additional roadblock had occurred in the interim: The outbreak of war between 
Israel and it’s Arab neighbours in June 1967 - the Six Day War - had led to a series of 
Congressional hearings on U.S. arms policies which had called into question the entire 
validity of the policy of arming nations, either through aid or credit, as national policy. 
Johnson was thus advised prior to the Shah’s visit that any future military commitments 
would have to be deferred due to the Congress effectively blocking any progress on new arms 
sales as a result of the hostility in the Middle East.
75
  
 
Congress was not the only obstacle to the Shah. AID had been a consistent voice against any 
further arms deals with Iran, causing Armin Meyer to accuse the agency of systematic ‘anti-
Iranism’.76 AID’s consistent guidance was that Iran should not be given any further military 
credit in 1967.
77
 An AID report on 31 May 1967 added further weight by expressing extreme 
pessimism regarding Iran’s balance of payments and its economic forecasts, and 
recommended a multi-agency delegation be despatched to Tehran to establish whether Iran 
could cope with taking on further debt. AID’s proposal was dismissed with prejudice within 
the State Department, which disagreed with the entire thrust of the report.
78
 Two weeks later, 
the State Department delivered their own, more optimistic assessment dismissing any sense of 
alarm, stating that relations with Iran were going through a ‘transition period’ with the Shah’s 
visit an opportunity to lay the foundations for the years ahead.
79
 The State Department had by 
this point become the most consistent pro-Iran-arms government agency in Washington. 
 
The Shah’s two-day August visit eventually comprised of two meetings with the President, 
which Johnson approached as a confidence building exercise for the Shah. As Rostow noted 
to Johnson, ‘you have nothing to negotiate but lots to talk about’.80 The Shah also attended 
meetings with the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk; the Director of Central Intelligence, Richard 
Helms (who would later become Ambassador to Iran during the Nixon administration); and 
attended a ‘friendly meeting’81 with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in which he 
made clear his intention to obtain arms elsewhere should the Congress stand in the way of his 
future purchase of American arms. Thus, the general mood in the administration was that the 
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visit had been successful and that the Shah had left ‘extremely happy’.82 It was also felt that 
the Shah had left with a fuller understanding of the Congressional roadblocks, which were 
previously explained, insufficiently as far as the Shah was concerned, as merely ‘unfortunate’ 
representations of the workings of the American political system.
83
 Yet, predictably, less than 
two months later on 15 November, the Shah wrote to Johnson informing him that his 
imminent defense needs would be in the order of $800 million for the five years following 
1967 and that he needed to know whether those purchases could be made from America.
84
 
The reassurance gained by his August visit temporarily lowered the sense of alarm that had 
been present through late 1966 and early 1967, yet the experience of 1966 made clear that the 
Shah would not wait indefinitely for an American response.   
 
The Shah’s next visit to Washington in June 1968 was an opportune moment for both parties 
to take stock of not only their divergent positions on Iran’s security, but of the developments 
in the Middle East and Gulf region, most notably news of the British removal of its military 
forces east of Suez by 1971. In the words of Theodore L. Eliot, Jr. who led the Iran desk at 
the State Department, the British announcement of its departure from the Gulf forced 
Washington into a position in which it had to decide ‘whether we should put so many chips in 
the Iranian basket when we have so many indications of Iranian irresponsibility’.85 A 6 June 
State Department memo anticipated that tangible progress on Iranian defense needs would be 
the ‘major topic’ of the Shah’s visit, separating it clearly from 1967 when the Shah had 
settled for broad sentiments of goodwill. The memo also noted that Moscow had once again 
placed a comprehensive deal on the table in late spring 1968 offering the Shah a plethora of 
advanced equipment, and that the Shah had twinned his Washington visit with plans for a 
subsequent visit to Moscow.
 86
 This raised the spectre, once again, that the Shah may accept 
the Soviet arms offer if his progress in Washington was less than satisfactory. The experience 
of 1966 had clearly demonstrated to the Shah the power of brinkmanship, and his actions here 
were an unabashed showing of further use of the tactic.  
 
A State Department background paper delivered on 8 June in preparation for the Shah’s visit 
explored the developing relations between Iran and the Soviet Union, noting that the Shah 
was courting his northern neighbour in a careful way, only ‘appearing’ to move closer with no 
intention of replacing his American alliance.
87
 On the other hand, whilst not doubting the 
bottom line pro-American orientation of Iran, the CIA once again expressed deep concerns 
upon learning that the Shah had been entertaining possible Soviet oil concessions in the South 
and West of Iran.
88
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An Interdepartmental Regional Group (IRG) comprising of representatives from each of the 
following agencies: AID, JCS, CIA, NSC, Bureau of the Budget, Department of Defense, 
State Department, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the United States 
Information Agency was tasked with discussing future arms policy options with Iran, meeting 
twice on 21 March and 3 April. It was concluded that the military relationship was ‘vital’, and 
anticipated that the response to the Shah’s forthcoming round of military requests would 
shape relations with Iran for years to come.
89
 The CIA delegation focused on the Shah’s 
worries over recent advanced Soviet arms deals with several radical Arab nations, and 
increased Soviet naval activity in the Mediterranean. The JCS delegation agreed, drawing 
attention to the need for a more significant air force to ensure Iranian defense, more from its 
Arab neighbours than the Soviets – thereby concurring for the first time with the Shah’s 
frequent assessments of the threat of Arab nationalism. The group made a provisional 
recommendation that a $100 million credit line should be offered for the existing year and put 
into place immediately, with provision for identical additional five yearly credit agreements, 
totalling $600 million over a six year period. This recommendation was within range of the 
Shah’s own estimates of his defense needs, which he had earlier placed at approximately 
$800 million over five years. It was hoped that an agreement could be solidified in 
Washington before the Shah’s visit.90  
 
The major opposition to the provisional conclusion of the IRG (other than the steady concerns 
of AID) was made by the Bureau of the Budget, which drew attention to the fact that the 
general climate for credit sales was unfavourable, chiefly due to Congress, and cautioned 
against entering into such a high level commitment with Iran.
91
 This prompted a pointed 
disagreement with the State Department’s Iran Desk officer, Theodore L. Eliot, Jr, who 
responded that ‘we have already blurred our future intentions as much as we can without risk 
of serious damage to our relations with Iran’.92 Ending the uncertainty, Dean Rusk, with the 
majority support of the various government agencies concerned, set out a plan for a credit line 
of between $75 million and $100 million for the current year, but cautioned against 
establishing a cast-iron long term five year deal in line with the recommendation of the 
Bureau of the Budget.
93
 Concluding the review process, the State Department recommended 
that the visit should convince the Shah that ‘our present and future administrations will wish 
to maintain our intimate relationship with Iran’, and stress that ‘military cooperation with Iran 
is fundamental to our overall relationship’.94 Thus, Washington was putting its cards on the 
table – offering with sincerity the best deal possible - and signalling that the Shah could look 
to America for its needs and once and for all end its flirtation with its northern neighbour.  
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Johnson concurred that Rusk’s proposal was sound, and that only the limited one year $100 
million deal would be offered upon arrival of the Shah, due to the difficulty of reaching 
consensus in Washington for a multi year deal.
95
 The fact that a $100 million was on the table 
at all was helped in part due to the departure of a frequently vocal and powerful critic of 
increasing arms credit sales, Robert McNamara, who had left his post of Secretary of Defense 
on 29 February 1968 due to emerging disagreements over the prosecution of the Vietnam 
War.
96
 The deal represented a significant American commitment in relative terms, as Iran’s 
$100 million deal only left $90 million of credit sales for the rest of the world due to a 
Congressionally imposed credit ceiling of $190 million for that fiscal year.
97
  
 
The visit itself was a measured success for the Shah. He gained approval for up to 50 US Air 
Force technicians to be deployed, for one year, to facilitate on-site training and support with 
Iran’s previously purchased F-4 squadrons, which were beginning to roll off the production 
line.
98
 Even though this was well below the 200 technicians the Shah originally asked for, 
placing American technicians in a position of maintaining a foreign fleet was contrary to 
standard policy,
99
 hence underlining the significance of the gesture. The Shah was also able to 
secure the promise of a presidential evaluation on his desire to purchase the Northrop 530 
aircraft.
100
 This was noteworthy via the fact that the State Department had briefed only weeks 
earlier on 1 July, that the Shah’s enquiry was extremely premature owing to the fact that the 
aircraft was still in the pre-design testing phase and had not yet even been purchased by the 
U.S. Air Force.
101
 
 
Whilst unable to seal the five-year military credit commitment he coveted, the $100 million 
dollar line of credit was received warmly. Johnson personally assured the Shah that further 
annual credit lines of similar amounts would be advocated for from his office, and series of 
reviews into the possibility of escalating American assistance to Iran were quickly initiated in 
the days following the visit via presidential mandate. Finally, the Shah’s insistence that a 
review was necessary of the defense of the Gulf in lieu of the British leaving was swiftly 
answered and another military survey team was despatched to Iran with the expectation that 
its report would signal the need for an increase in future credit sales.
102
  
 
Despite Johnson’s desire to help Iran further, it was deemed unlikely that much more could be 
done in the administration’s remaining time in office, with the best near term option being to 
assure the Shah that Johnson would impress upon his successor the importance of the 
developing relationship, and continue to lobby Congress for a more significant arms credit 
line for Iran.
103
 This emphasis, easily overlooked, is actually quite significant in that it aligned 
broadly with Nixon’s outlook and established a momentum through the transition period 
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between the Johnson and Nixon administrations that would serve as the origins of the next 
evolution in U.S.-Iran relations. 
Conclusion 
 
With the positive impression imparted following the 1968 visit to Washington, the Johnson 
years ended much better for the Shah than they began. The visit rounded off an evolutionary 
progression that first began in 1964 with the first credit agreement, but had its real roots in the 
summer of 1966 when the Johnson administration decided to end its policy of dithering over 
the Shah’s arms requests and attempt to meet the spirit of his military needs. While the Shah’s 
flirtation with a high level arms deal with the Soviets had been the hinge point that gained 
proactive American attention in 1966, by 1968 the sustained Soviet offer of arms was more of 
a sideshow for the Shah which he retained only as an insurance policy in lieu of the success of 
harnessing the Soviet spectre in winning him high level American attention in 1966. By 1968, 
the announcement of the departure of the British from the Gulf had moved the evolution in 
relations one step further. Fears of a Cold War vacuum in an unstable hot spot filled with 
Soviet leaning nations had added to a gradual pattern of sympathy for the Shah’s plight within 
the State Department, and subsequently in other agencies, and convinced Johnson that the 
Shah was an ally of significance. Hence, the Shah’s 1968 visit was the tokenistic starting 
point beginning the first concerted (albeit tentative) movement towards an American 
concurrence that Iran’s national security needs necessitated an on-going wholesale upgrade of 
its military. 
 
The summer of 1968 was the high point in an otherwise frustrating, and at times highly 
strained period of history between Iran and America in which diplomacy had reached 
frequent low points, and overcome several crises, particularly via the Shah’s brinkmanship 
with the Soviet Union. By 1968 the Shah had finally made major steps into gaining his 
coveted prize of a mature partnership role with America, rather than maintenance of client 
state status, which he clearly disregarded as a relic in the post-British era in the Gulf. An 
evolving, yet fragile momentum was bequeathed to Richard Nixon, who triumphed in the 
presidential election of November 1968. The fact that Johnson was only able to secure a tight 
one-year credit arrangement for 1968, with only a provisional promise for further annual 
deals, created a sense of inevitability that Nixon would not have long to wait before the Shah 
was knocking on his door as the march towards the full and final British departure from the 
Gulf in late 1971 neared. 
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